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Problematic aspects of neighborhood policy
As for the problems and shortcomings of the proposed by the European Union European Neighborhood Policy, the principal among them are the following:
1. Lack of gradation of the partner countries to “European” and “non-European”. In particular, Belarus has sought and supported the establishment of a separate “Eastern Dimension” of the ENP, this idea was present in the proposals of Poland. This kind of distinction would put European neighboring countries in a more privileged position than the other partner countries, given the fact that it is for European neighboring countries at this stage there is a theoretical possibility of future entry into the EU, which is excluded for other States. Thus, the development of relationships with the European neighboring countries should have a slightly different quality content. However, the existing differences in the development of a vector of relations with third countries among the EU member states and especially the strong reluctance of France to further withdrawal of the EU to the east, led to the fact that Eastern European and Mediterranean areas of ENP should be “in one harness” and balance each other.
2. Dissatisfaction of partner countries with the proposed by the EU within the ENP level of cooperation. Moldova and the Ukraine in 2003 – 2010 in various ways formulated priorities for collaboration with the EU due to political changes in countries, however, often expressed disagreement with the neighboring relations between them and the EU. Although they are actively involved in the implementation of the ENP, however, parallel they insist that the EU signaled its willingness to join these countries, denoting in this time frame. The European Union, by contrast, insists that first the features of ENP shall be used, and it is still too early to tell about the prospect of membership of these countries. Russia rejects the EU Neighborhood Policy, stressing that the scope of EU-Russia relations are much higher and requires a special privileged status, thus Russia does not accept “non-exclusiveness” of the policy in relation to itself. The Republic of Belarus, by contrast, made a sufficiently strong desire to participate in the ENP. However, our country's participation is conditional to certain political and economic developments. Thus, the European Union has not tried to find using the ENP new “recipe” for a full-fledged development of relations with Belarus. With regard to the Mediterranean countries, also there are not yet clear perspective and the benefits of the ENP for them, as in many respects the principles and mechanisms of this policy are common with the Barcelona process, carried out during the decade in this region.
3. Attitude towards partner country not as to the subject, but as an object. The previous practice of constructing the EU's relations with third countries in the regions covered by the ENP, in particular, within the process of EU enlargement to the East, has shown that the European Union defines almost unilaterally “rules” that must be taken, or else - an alternative to stay “for overboard”. Neighboring countries fear that, despite the declaration by the EU on the partnership nature of relations within the ENP, after all, the policy will have a “paternalistic character” from the EU side. Thus, in particular, in developing specific action plans for each country, although in EU documents it is stated that they should be developed together with the partner country, however, the ultimate “edition” is in the competence of the EU. In addition, the European Union has established priority areas for cooperation, which are not always paramount for the partner-country, which maybe would like to develop other more pressing areas, however, taking into account that the funding is due to EU funds and, thus it is the EU who defines the scope and direction of funding; partner country can only try to achieve sufficiently small concessions towards it.
4. Many obligations for member partners, the vagueness of the declarative and benefits of the EU. Analyzing the action plans, we can conclude that, in particular, the Action Plan for the Ukraine, which has 29 pages, this country must do a considerable amount of liabilities. However, in this regard, there are no precise descriptions of what advantages the Ukraine will receive in case of fulfillment of certain obligations. Thus, at this stage, the potential benefits for the partner countries are registered only in the EU strategy paper on ENP.
5. The absence of a clear program of enhancing regional cooperation among the NIS. The European Union in the documents on the ENP on 11 March 2003 and on 12 May 2004 a lot of attention paid to the development of regional cooperation among the countries-partners. If for the Mediterranean countries such cooperation is actively developing and is promoted by the EU within the Barcelona process, for the Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus there is no a regional organization, which would have involved the European Union. How the EU is going to encourage the development of regional cooperation among these countries is unclear. Especially because the EU states that it has no intention to create new regional organizations, and will provide assistance within the existing structures. But there is no organization, which will include only these three countries. Also, the inclusion of Russia into the ENP, in particular with a view to fostering regional cooperation, failed, because Russia does not intend to build relations with the Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus with the help of EU mediation.
6. Large concerns of Russia regarding the implementation of the ENP from the EU – Russia is afraid to lose its influence in the former Soviet Union. Thus, the European Neighborhood Policy is perceived by Russia as a “foreign policy strategy” of the EU in respect of the affected countries. Of course, Russia does not want to strengthen the EU position in the neighboring countries of the CIS to the detriment of Russia's position. It is no coincidence that Russia refuses to discuss relations with these countries within the framework of Russia-EU summit, references about these countries are missing even in conjunction documents.
7. The ideological component in the definition of common values (the possibility of double standards.) The basis for relations between the EU and partner-country within the ENP is the respect of shared values. However, in this sense, there may be some problems. How to set the level and quality of compliance with these values? After all, in the new EU members, particularly in the Baltic countries there are sufficient problems in human rights, namely the Russian-speaking minority. The European Union did not depoliticize the relations within the ENP, which led to the fact that the Republic of Belarus can not fully participate in the programs of the ENP. However, after the collapse of the bipolar system of international relations in the European Union and the world in general, there is the process of revising the common values. In times of bloc confrontation “Western values” were the opposite of “Communist values”. Now this relationship is not working. Attempts to base policy, making major bets on the principle of respect of human rights and free interpretation of this principle, both the countries of the former socialist bloc and Islamic countries, made a break down and lead to quite opposite results. There is a need to rethink and develop a system of shared values, understanding and the real significance of which would constitute a real pragmatic and constructive basis for the construction of interstate relations.
8. Transfer of existing shortcomings in arranging funding to a new mechanism of IEPS. Programming and implementation of the ENP will be implemented from the center – from Brussels. Given the negative experiences in the implementation of existing financial instruments, where the bureaucratic costs in the implementation of specific projects have led to a virtual standstill in the implementation of programs and their funding. Thus, in particular in Poland the program PHARE did not operate for almost a year. New tool of the ENP will be built similar to the previous financial instruments, which involves transferring the existing defects of the functioning of such instruments to IEPS. However, there is a possibility of transfer of funds between the two funding mechanisms of IEPS, as well as between projects and programs within these two mechanisms.
9. Different interests of the EU member states with regard to neighboring countries. Obviously, the quality and pace of development of relations with the partner-country will depend not only on the progress that reaches the country in implementation of undertaken in the framework of the ENP and the prescribed action plans. the interest of the EU and its member countries will play not the last role, in particular, will improve and expand the level of cooperation with the country. As in the case of the EU enlargement to the East different interests of EU member states will have a significant influence on the formation of a common EU position. Especially three NIS, since at this stage the EU priorities gradually shifted to other regions. As mentioned above, failure to establish a separate “Eastern Dimension” and the lack of quality level action plans for the Ukraine and Moldova were due to the lack of general interest with respect to the eastern neighbors. For many EU member states the Ukraine, and especially Moldova and Belarus, are not priority partners. The greatest interest in developing relations with these countries was exhibited by Poland, the Baltic States, Scandinavian countries and Slovakia. Germany has taken a neutral stance, not wanting to be in conflict with France, which, in turn, as well as Spain and Italy do not have a strong interest in this region, their interest – the Mediterranean countries. Such disunity could lead to the fact that, despite the declared in the ENP “Progress-benefits” correlation, the basis for the development of relations with the partner country will be just in the domestic interest of the EU member states, which could undermine the value of the ENP, lead to frustration with by neighboring countries and undermine the authority of the EU for these countries.
With regard to Belarus there was a position of the EU, proposed in the Strategy Document of the EC “European Neighborhood Policy” dated 12 May 2004. This document states that “in current circumstances it is impossible to offer Belarus the benefits of the European Neighborhood Policy”,. Thus, Belarus was not provided with the adoption of the Plan of Action, which greatly limits the possibilities for cooperation. It is stated that “in case of significant political and economic reforms, Belarus will be able to participate indefinitely in the European Neighborhood Policy”. As a long-term objectives of the EU towards Belarus in the strategy “European Neighborhood Policy” it is defined that “Belarus is a democratic, stable, secure and prosperous partner with whom the EU has not only by common borders but also carries out joint activities, based on shared values”. It is also stated that the EU should more actively cooperate with Belarus in such areas as support of democratization and independent media, the problems of the regions affected by the Chernobyl disaster, humanitarian assistance and regional cooperation. Already Belarus participates in three programs of Neighborhood: Baltic Sea Program, Latvia-Lithuania-Belarus, Poland-Ukraine-Belarus.
See also: Belarus – EU Partnership: First Results and New Perspectives
© National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, 2011
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